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Televising California's Death Penalty: Is





Imagine twenty-six people standing in silence, unable to remove
their eyes from a person strapped into a chair inside an airtight chamber.
Cyanide splashes into acid and shatters the silence of the death chamber
as gas fills the air like thick fog. The condemned writhes in pain in her
death throes. While twenty-six witnesses watch in silence, millions of
television viewers watch with them in the privacy of their own homes.
Does the broadcast media have the right to televise an execution? This
Note argues that it does.
Whether the death penalty should be used as a means of punishing
criminals presents one of the most hotly debated topics in our society.
This Note does not attempt to resolve that controversial issue. However,
television has thrust a new controversy into this arena of debate: Is there
a constitutional right to televise executions? In the summer of 1991, San
Francisco's public television station, KQED, sought to televise the exe-
cution of Robert Alton Harris.' The warden at San Quentin Prison,2
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1990, University of California, Davis. The Author
wishes to thank his parents for their support in all his endeavors. The Author also wishes to
thank Professors Calvin Massey and Scott Sundby for their guidance in the process of writing
this Note. Finally, the Author wishes to thank Michael F. Truskol, Attorney at Law, for his
influence and inspiration in the Author's life.
1. KQED ultimately brought suit on this issue. See KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383
RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19791 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1991). Robert Alton Harris was
condemned to die in the execution chamber for the 1978 murder of two San Diego teenagers.
Life Sentence for Guilty Plea in Murder Case-Harris Execution Helped Make Up Mind, S.F.
CHRON., June 30, 1992, at A13. Harris was the first prisoner to be executed in California in 25
years. A Plan to Allow Inmates to Pick Poison or Gas, S.F. CHRON., May 13, 1992, at A14.
2. Courts that render the death sentence may designate the place of execution to be a
state prison other than San Quentin. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3603 (West 1982). However, San
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Daniel Vasquez, allowed neither electronic equipment nor writing imple-
ments into the execution chamber. 3 KQED sued unsuccessfully in fed-
eral district court asserting a constitutional right to televise executions.
This Note assumes that the death penalty will be imposed with
greater frequency in the future because a majority of states have recently
enacted itA Moreover, a federal crime bill is pending that would signifi-
cantly expand the use of the death penalty.6 If the frequency of the death
penalty increases, then the issue of whether a right to televise executions
exists will become more important in the future.
Focusing on California's execution procedure, this Note argues that
there is a constitutional right to televise executions based on the First,
Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. Part I of this Note analyzes the
two criteria on which a First Amendment right of access must be based.
It applies these criteria to the execution context, arguing that the broad-
cast media may successfully assert a right of access to the execution
chamber. Part II argues that the electronic media may also prevail on a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim to gain access to the exe-
cution chamber. Finally, Part III posits a nexus between the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press and the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment that further protects
the broadcast media's right of access to the execution chamber by argu-
ing that the use of the camera would promote the establishment of a
societal standard of cruel and unusual punishment with respect to the
mode of execution.
Quentin is the statutorily designated location for executions. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3600
(West 1982). Prior to a 1943 amendment, this statute required "delivery [of the prisoner] to
the warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin." 1941 ch. 106, sec. 15, § 3600, 1941
Cal. Stat. 1080, 1117 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 3600 (West 1982)).
3. See San Quentin Institution Procedure No. 769, at 16 (rev. Mar. 8, 1990) [hereinafter
Execution Procedures].
4. KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19791, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 13, 1991). KQED lost its case and no appeal has been filed.
5. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
J.) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1,209, 219 (West Supp. 1976) and recently enacted codes
of thirty-four other states providing for the death penalty, including Alabama, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming, in support of the
proposition that society endorsed the death penalty).
Because a majority of states have recently enacted the death penalty following a period
during which it was not used, this Note anticipates an increase in the frequency of the death
penalty. See G. Mark Mamantov, Note, The Executioner's Song: Is There a Right to Listen?,
69 VA. L. REV. 373, 373 (1983) ("[E]xecutions may occur at a rate of more than three per
week within the next few years.").
6. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see 138 CONG. REC. S3939 (daily ed. Mar.
19, 1992) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("This bill adds 53 death penalty offenses-the single larg-
est expansion of the Federal death penalty in the history of the Congress.").
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I. The Television Media's First Amendment Right of Access to
the Execution Chamber
This Part first addresses the merits of the broadcast media's claim to
a First Amendment right of access to executions. The issue of whether a
First Amendment right of access exists must be analyzed in terms of two
criteria: 1) Whether a particular event to which one seeks access has
been traditionally open to the public; and 2) whether the role of the press
in a particular event is important to the functioning of a republican form
of government. In applying these criteria to each of a series of cases, 7 the
Supreme Court found that a First Amendment right of access exists un-
less the particular restriction is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest.8 Moreover, in Chandler v. Florida9 the Court held that
"the Constitution does not prohibit a state from experimenting with the
program [of televising trials] authorized by [the canons of judicial eth-
ics]." 0 After analyzing these criteria, this Part will apply them to the
execution context and argue that the television media has a right of ac-
cess to the execution chamber based on the First Amendment.
A. The Historical Openness Criterion
The Court first faced the issue of the press's right of access to a
criminal trial in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia." In holding that a
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials exists, the Court rea-
soned that criminal trials traditionally have been open to the public, a
tradition dating "back beyond reliable historical records."' 2 The Court
noted that "[w]hat is significant for present purposes is that throughout
its evolution, the trial has been open to all who care to observe."' 3 Writ-
ing for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice Burger traced the openness
of criminal trials to "the days before the Norman Conquest.' 4 In ex-
plaining why criminal trials were open, he first stated that openness
"gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all con-
cerned." 15 Later, Burger reasoned that this openness served a therapeu-
7. This note will refer to the following cases collectively as the Quartet cases: Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press 1], 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Court [Press I], 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
8. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.);
Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07; Press I, 464 U.S. at 509-10; Press 11, 478 U.S. at 9-10.
9. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
10. Id. at 583.
11. See 448 U.S. at 564 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 565.
15. Id. at 569 (citing MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENG-
LAND 343-45 (6th ed. 1820) and 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73).
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tic purpose within the community: "people sensed from experience and
observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the
means used to achieve justice must have support derived from public ac-
ceptance of both the process and its results." 16 Burger explained that
when a shocking crime occurs, the community is outraged, and subse-
quent open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for com-
munity concern, hostility, and emotion....
... The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of jus-
tice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if
justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert manner." ....
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohib-
ited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the open,
there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in
general and its workings in a particular case .... 17
Finally, Burger stated: "Instead of acquiring information about trials by
firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended,
people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In
a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the
public."18 Burger's observations are significant in the execution context.
Prophylactic or cathartic purposes are impeded if the execution is carried
out covertly. If such purposes are to be achieved, they are best achieved
by granting access to executions to the surrogate of the public-the
press. 19
B. The Structural Criterion
In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan
expounded the second criterion on which a First Amendment right may
be founded, stating that "the First Amendment embodies more than a
commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their
own sake; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our
republican system of self-government."'20 Justice Brennan described
three structural roles played by the First Amendment freedom of the
press. First, he asserted that a free press tends to make public debate
more informed: "Implicit in this structural role is not only 'the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
16. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 571-72 (quoting THE 1677 CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEWv
JERSEY, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 180, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959))
(alteration by court).
18. Id. at 572-73.
19. Richmond Newspapers did not address camera access. See id. On the contemporary
power of the video medium, see infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
20. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
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open,' but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate...
must be informed.
'21
Second, Justice Brennan stated that a free press acts as a check on
the criminal justice system: "[P]ublic access to court proceedings is one
of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our system, because 'contempo-
raneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on
possible abuse of judicial power .... "-22
Finally, Justice Brennan wrote that a trial must convey the appear-
ance of fairness in order to be truly fair: "The trial is a means of meeting
'the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice." ' ".23 Brennan went on to explain that
"[c]losed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in
turn spawns disrespect for the law. Public access is essential, therefore, if
trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining public confi-
dence in the administration of justice." 24
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 25 these same criteria were
used by the Court to prevent the closure of a sex crime trial during the
testimony of the minor victim. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
stated:
Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the
various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve to explain
why a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly af-
forded protection by the First Amendment. First, the criminal trial
has been historically open to the press and general public....
Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the gov-
ernment as a whole.26
Although Justice Brennan acknowledged that the media's First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials is not absolute,27 he stated that it
may only be infringed where the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.2
8
Again, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 129 the Court ap-
plied these same criteria to allow press access to voir dire transcripts. 30
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, reviewed the history of
21. Id. at 587-88 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
22. Id. at 592 (quoting In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
23. Id. at 594 (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))).
24. Id. at 595.
25. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
26. Id. at 605-06.
27. Id. at 607 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion of
Burger, C.J.)).
28. Id. at 606-07.
29. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
30. Id. at 508-10, 513.
criminal trials and the jury selection process, and found that these pro-
ceedings had been open since "before the Norman Conquest. 31 Burger
echoed Justice Brennan's structural criterion when he asserted: "Open-
ness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."
'32
Like Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Burger also asserted that open trials
serve a therapeutic purpose within the community.33 Finally, the Court
held that the First Amendment right of access may only be overcome by
a narrowly tailored, compelling state interest.3 4 In this particular case,
the lower court closed the entire six week period of voir dire without
considering less intrusive alternatives; absent such consideration, "the
trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire."
3 5
In the last of the Quartet cases, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court 11,36 the Court applied the same criteria to a non-trial context,
holding that the First Amendment right of access includes access to the
transcript of a preliminary hearing despite the fact that the proceeding
involved was not a trial.37 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the
Court held:
The considerations that led the Court to apply the First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers and
Globe and the selection of jurors in [Press 1] lead us to conclude that
the right of access applies to preliminary hearings ....
First, there has been a tradition of accessibility to preliminary
hearings....
The second question is whether public access to preliminary hear-
ings.., plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual func-
tioning of the process.
38
The Court reiterated that the right may be overcome only by narrowly
tailored means in service of a compelling state interest.39 Significantly,
the state interest asserted was that of ensuring a fair trial. In response to
this assertion, the Court stated:
[T]he preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are
made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that
the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that
31. Id. at 505.
32. Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71 (1980)
(plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
33. Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570).
34. Id. at 509-10.
35. Id. at 511.
36. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 10-11.
39. Id. at 9.
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closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure
cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.
40
One must note that a defendant's interest in a fair trial is entirely absent
from the execution context because by the date of the execution the trial
is over and the appeal process has been exhausted. Moreover, there are
alternatives other than an absolute ban on cameras. This point will be
expanded later in this Note.
41
Finally, the Court in Chandler v. Florida addressed the issue of
whether "a state may provide for... televisionl and still photographic
coverage of a criminal trial for public broadcast, notwithstanding the ob-
jection of the accused." 42 The Florida Supreme Court had adopted such
a provision in Canon 3A(7) of its Code of Judicial Ethics.43 The United
States Supreme Court held that "the Constitution does not prohibit a
state from experimenting with the program authorized by revised Canon
3A(7)." 44 Although the Court expressed no opinion regarding an access
right for the press, the Florida Supreme Court, which had previously
rendered an opinion in a related case, held that "on balance there is more
to be gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage of judicial
proceedings subject to standards for such coverage."' 45 The Florida
Supreme Court reasoned that "[lt is essential that the populace have
confidence in the process, for public acceptance of judicial judgments and
decisions is manifestly necessary to their observance. Consequently, pub-
lic understanding of the judicial system, as opposed to suspicion, is
imperative."
'46
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the broadcast media's
right of access to voir dire and to trials.47 In each instance, the Court
referred to two criteria: the historical openness of an event or practice
and the structural role of the press, to determine whether the broadcast
media has a First Amendment right of access to a particular stage in the
judicial proceedings. If the electronic press can satisfy these criteria in
40. Id at 14 (emphasis added) (citing Press 1464 U.S. at 5 10 and Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 166-169.
42. 449 U.S. 560, 562 (1981).
43. Id. at 564-66. As quoted by the Court, this canon provided:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct
of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and
(iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending cause, electronic media
and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and
trial courts of this state shall be allowed ....
Id. at 566.
44. Id. at 583.
45. In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, 370 So.2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979).
46. Id. at 780-81 (citation omitted).
47. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 567 (television camera recorded voir dire); id. at 583 (Con-
stitution does not prohibit state from televising criminal trial).
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the context of an execution, which is merely another judicial proceeding,
it may successfully assert a First Amendment right of access to the exe-
cution chamber.
C. Public Access and the Role of the Press in the Execution Chamber
The Quartet cases establish a First Amendment right of access to a
particular process when: 1) that process has been traditionally open and
2) press access serves a positive structural role in the functioning of that
process. When these criteria are satisfied, the right may be overcome
only by an exclusion scheme narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. If the execution process has traditionally been open, and if
camera access plays a positive structural role in the execution process,
then the broadcast media's First Amendment right of access should ex-
tend as far as the execution chamber.
(1) The History of Public Access to Executions
Executions were traditionally open in this country.48 At the "time
of our earliest decisions upholding capital punishment, a substantial por-
tion of California's residents had witnessed executions." 49 Currently,
however, California conducts executions within the walls of San Quentin
Prison.
Although California's executions occur in San Quentin, which is
generally closed to the public, the executions are still sufficiently open to
the public to satisfy the first prong of the Court's test for establishing a
First Amendment right of access. G. Mark Mamantov has noted that
"historical momentum would appear to favor closing executions, rather
than opening them to the press and public." °50 Unlike courtrooms, which
are open to the public,5 the execution chamber is closed to the public.
Nevertheless, two arguments support the view that executions are suffi-
ciently "open" to warrant a right of press access.
First, the warden is required to select twelve official witnesses and
fourteen media witnesses to attend all executions. 52 A process that in-
cludes members of the general public, even if limited in number, cannot
be said to be completely closed. The only standard a witness must meet
48. See Mamantov, supra note 5, at 375-77.
49. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 641, 493 P.2d 880, 889, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161,
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
50. Mamantov, supra note 5, at 388.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (West Supp. 1992); Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at
4, 6, 15; Vasquez Deposition at 32-38, 57, KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19791 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1991).
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is that she be reputable.5 3 Presuming that the witness is reputable, the
execution process is open to her54 and therefore not completely closed.
Second, consider the nature of a prison and the necessity of main-
taining security within it. Consider the physical space limitations within
an execution chamber.5 5 The "closed nature" of the execution process
can be seen as a function of the physical limitations of both the execution
chamber and the prison environment, which are designed to prohibit
freedom of movement, rather than a policy judgment to close executions
to the public.
These two arguments strongly support the notion that the fourteen
media witnesses serve as surrogates for the public at large; the press pro-
vides the public with an eyewitness account of the execution. 6 In fact,
the current policy requires the media witnesses to "give their pool com-
mentary and recounting [sic] to the other assembled media."' 57 Thus, the
media witnesses act as surrogates for the non-witness media. The media
witnesses simultaneously act as surrogates for the public in that part of
the standard by which they are selected includes "the broadest cross-
section of media format and greatest circulation/viewers." 58 This selec-
tion criterion acknowledges the structural importance of the press as the
eyes and ears of the public. As Chief Justice Burger stated in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia: "[P]eople now acquire [information about trials]
chiefly through the print and electronic media.... This 'contribute[s] to
public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system . . .59
Although the execution chamber may not be located in the center of
the town square, this Note asserts that the chamber is as open as space
and security limitations allow, and is open to the surrogates of the public.
Thus, the execution process was traditionally open and remains suffi-
ciently open to satisfy the first criterion of the Richmond Newspapers test.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (West Supp. 1992); Vasquez Deposition at 32, Vasquez
(No. C 90-1383 RHS) ("Q. What are the standards used in choosing the witnesses? A. First,
that they be reputable... second, that they be stable, emotionally strong and physically strong
too-I concern myself about the effect on them of witnessing such circumstances as an
execution.").
54. Assuming the warden selects her. See supra note 53.
55. The fire marshal has determined the capacity of the execution chamber to be 50 per-
sons. See Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at 15.
56. San Quentin Institution Procedure requires the media witnesses to an execution to
relay what they saw to the media waiting outside. See Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at
14.
57. Id.
58. Id at 6; Vasquez Deposition at 36, KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19791 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1991).
59. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.)
(quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment)).
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(2) The Structural Role of the Press in the Execution Process
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan spelled out the positive
structural roles that the press may play in securing and fostering a repub-
lican form of self-government. 60 First, as Justice Brennan stated in his
concurrence in the judgment of Richmond Newspapers, "Implicit in this
structural role is not only 'the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,' but also the antecedent
proposition that valuable public debate ... must be informed. ' 6 1 Sec-
ond, "public access to court proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks
and balances' of our system, because 'contemporaneous review in the fo-
rum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial
power.' "62 Third, the open process accords with the notion that "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.' ' 63 Finally, an open process serves
a therapeutic or cathartic purpose within the community:
Civilized societies withdraw from both the victim and the vigi-
lante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from
people's consciousness the ... urge for retribution. The crucial pro-
phylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the
dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a comer
[or] in any covert manner." 64
The camera is ideally suited to perform all four of these functions in
the execution process. First, the death penalty is a hotly debated subject:
both the public and the Court are divided regarding its constitutional-
ity.65 According to the Court's theory of the structural role of the press
in a republican system of government, 66 such debate must be informed to
be effective. 67 Televising executions would not only provide a greater
amount of accurate information, 68 it would also spark renewed debate.
Second, television access would enable the entire nation to act as a
check on the government. 69 As it stands, it is difficult for anyone but the
60. Id. at 571-74 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 587-97 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in judgment).
61. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote omitted) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
62. Id. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
63. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
64. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (quoting
THE 1677 CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY, reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 180, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959)) (alteration by court).
65. For evidence of this, see the five separate opinions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
66. See supra text accompanying note 17.
67. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in judgment).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
69. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
One might ask why the state must be watched. It seems self-evident in a republican form of
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selected fourteen witnesses to serve as "watchdog" over the state during
its final act in the gravest of criminal proceedings. Indeed, the state must
be watched most carefully in this lethal context. Television would serve
this role better than the print media and thus should be granted access to
the execution chamber.
70
Third, television creates an open process and a respect for the judi-
cial system in the spirit of the Court's declaration that "justice must sat-
isfy the appearance of justice. ' 71 Satisfying the appearance of justice is
especially important in the context of an execution, where error cannot
be reversed. 72 The criminal justice system faces more difficulty in main-
taining the public's respect for the legitimacy of the death penalty when
executions remain hidden from public scrutiny than it would if the public
were permitted to examine the process directly. As the Court observed,
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing."
'73
Finally, television access to the execution chamber would foster the
community catharsis of which Chief Justice Burger wrote.74 Burger as-
serted that the open process serves a prophylactic purpose by quelling
society's retributive urge.75 Insofar as the death penalty assuages the
urge for both vigilante justice and retribution, this purpose would be fur-
ther served by televising executions. The fourteen media witnesses76 in
government that the state must not covertly undertake an act as controversial and severe as
that of taking a person's life. One need not stretch the imagination too far to envision a host of
cruel and unusual punishments, such as "burning at the stake, crucifixion, [or] breaking on the
wheel." Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 n.4 (1947) (quoting In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890)).
In any event, the state legislature has at least implicitly acknowledged the need for a
"watchdog" by requiring witnesses to be present at the execution. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3605 (West Supp. 1992). Given the provision for a watchdog, this Note asserts that televi-
sion cameras perform the watchdog function better than the twenty-six witnesses. See infra
text accompanying notes 79-86.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
71. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
72. Examples of such error might include cruelty in the application of the execution pro-
cedure, or an improper or unduly painful procedure, such as when the first application of the
electric chair fails. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947). Public
knowledge of these types of events would have some bearing on society's determination of
whether the means of execution is cruel or unusual.
73. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press 1], 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
74. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
75. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 64.
76. These witnesses include all forms of media; however, cameras and other electronic
devices are not allowed. See Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at 16.
the execution chamber perform, to the degree that they are able,77 the
structural roles necessary to a republican form of government. 78 But be-
cause the television camera performs these roles better than any other
medium, the electronic media should have a right of access to the execu-
tion chamber.
The electronic media is superior to the print media both qualita-
tively and quantitatively. Qualitatively, the camera has several advan-
tages over the newspaper. For example, the print media must filter the
sights, sounds, and smells of the entire prison experience and execution
process through the memory and notes of a writer. As such, the experi-
ence is subject to the writer's potential biases and faults. In contrast, the
clich6 "a picture is worth a thousand words" rings true in this setting. A
television image can convey exactly what a spectator would see if she
were present within the execution chamber. Justice Stewart acknowl-
edged this crucial difference in his concurrence in the judgment of
Houchins v. KQED: "A person touring Santa Rita jail can grasp its real-
ity with his own eyes and ears. But if a television reporter is to convey
the jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place,
he must use cameras and sound equipment. '79 Other courts have ac-
knowledged the camera's superiority as well: "[V]isual impressions...
add a material dimension to one's impression of particular news events.
Television film coverage of the news provides a comprehensive visual ele-
ment and an immediacy, or simultaneous aspect, not found in print
media." 80
The electronic media can also claim a quantitative superiority over
the print media. Sixty-five percent of all adults acquire most of their
news from television.81 Newspapers finish second at forty-two percent,
radio third at fourteen percent, and magazines fourth at four percent.3 2
Television has led all other media as the primary source of news since the
early 1960s and has enjoyed at least a twenty point lead over newspapers
77. By comparison with electronic media, the print media are qualitatively and quantita-
tively less effective. See infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
78. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
79. 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
80. Cable News Network v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Justice
Powell remarked that the public is "the loser" when news coverage is limited to "watered-
down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture.... This is hardly the kind of
news reportage that the First Amendment is meant to foster." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Even the California Supreme Court has acknowledged the difference, in that some events
in the criminal process are "simply indescribable in mere words" and therefore require photo-
graphic presentation. See People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 182, 785 P.2d 857, 885, 266
Cal. Rptr. 309, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 226 (1990).
81. TIO/ROPER REPORT, AMERICA'S WATCHING: 30TH ANNIVERSARY, 1959-1989, at
14 (1989).
82. Id.
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since 1980.83 "Whereas nearly all American homes have at least one
television set which is on an average of seven hours each day, only about
half of all Americans buy daily newspapers. ' 84 Most striking of all is
that only two percent of Americans derive their news from sources exclu-
sive of television. 85 By televising executions, the media would substan-
tially increase the accuracy and availability of information and thereby
foster public debate, thus contributing to the formation of a societal con-
sensus regarding the standard for cruel and unusual punishment. 86 For
evidence of television's pervasive role in our society, one need only recall
recent events such as the Gulf War, the confirmation hearings of Justice
Clarence Thomas, and the Los Angeles riots, during which time most
people were glued to their television sets. Given the vast superiority in
terms of viewers of the electronic media, to deny electronic media cover-
age of executions is to unduly restrict the structural role that the public,
through the surrogacy of the camera, must play in the legal process. The
camera is best able to fulfill the role of the press contemplated in the First
Amendment.
D. Argument from Analogy
Support for the electronic media's right of access to the execution
chamber may be found by analogizing to the Supreme Court's reasoning
in the Quartet of cases. 87 Although these cases acknowledge that the
right of access may be limited by the right to privacy and the fair trial
interest of the accused, in each of the cases the media's right of access
prevailed.88 This Note posits that as in the case of preliminary examina-
tions, voir dire proceedings, and criminal trials, an execution is a compo-
83. Id.
84. David N. Kuriyama, Comment, The "Right of Information Triangle". A First
Amendment Basis for Televising Judicial Proceedings, 4 U. HAw. L. REv. 85, 133 (1982) (cit-
ing Herald Price Fahringer, Cameras in the Courtroom (TV or not TV?-That is the Question),
TRIAL DIPLOMACY J., Winter 1980-81, at 4, 5).
85. TIO/RoPER REPORT, supra note 81, at 27; see also Cable News Network v. ABC,
518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (noting the increasingly prominent role of television
news "in informing the public at large of the workings of government").
86. See infra Part IIl.
87. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (allowing press access to
criminal trial); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (upholding right
of press access to testimony of juvenile victim in a sex crime trial); Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court [Press 1], 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (allowing press access to voir dire transcripts in
criminal proceeding); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press I], 478 U.S. 1 (1986)
(holding right of press access applies to preliminary hearings, not just trials).
These four cases do not address the rights of the television media. However, the analogy
to the right of access of the print media is appealing and takes on added force in light of the
qualitative and quantitative superiority of the electronic media. See supra text accompanying
notes 79-86.
88. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.);
Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07; Press , 464 U.S. at 509-10; Press II, 478 U.S. at 13-14.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
nent of a criminal proceeding to which the electronic media should have
a right of access. Camera access to an execution would not jeopardize
the right to a fair trial since by the date of the execution the appeals
process has been exhausted and all that remains is the execution of the
sentence by the state.89 The analogy is made complete by reference to
Chandler v. Florida, which allowed the electronic media to televise tri-
als.90 If the camera may gain entrance to judicial processes ranging from
preliminary hearings and voir dire to actual trials, then there is no mani-
fest reason to deny access to the execution chamber, which represents the
last in a series of judicial processes.
E. Counterarguments
There are three plausible arguments against allowing the camera
into the execution chamber. These arguments are based on: 1) case law;
2) prison regulations as time, place, and manner restrictions; and 3) the
condemned's right to privacy. This Note contends that none of these
arguments outweighs the media's right to televise executions.
(1) Case Law
The case law argument against camera access relies on four cases in
which courts have denied the electronic media access in prison contexts:
Pell v. Procunier, 91 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,92 Houchins v. KQED,93
and Garrett v. Estelle.94 Upon close inspection, however, these cases do
not foreclose the establishment of the broadcast media's First Amend-
ment right of access to the execution chamber. In fact, one can argue in
favor of press access based on these cases.
In both Pell and Saxbe, prison regulations prevented media inter-
views with specific inmates. 95 The issue in each case was whether the
prohibition of interviews violated the freedom of the press guaranteed by
the First Amendment.96 In upholding the prison regulations in both in-
stances, the Court held that the media has no constitutional right of ac-
cess beyond that afforded to the general public.97 An opponent of
electronic media access might argue that since the general public does
not have access to the execution chamber, Pell and Saxbe should be read
to deny the broadcast media a right of access to executions since granting
such a right would extend the media's constitutional right beyond that
89. The right to privacy is discussed infra at Part I.E.3.
90. 449 U.S. 560, 583 (1981).
91. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
92. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
93. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
94. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
95. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844.
96. Pell, 417 U.S. at 829; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844-45.
97. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
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afforded the general public. However, this argument ignores the fact that
fourteen media witnesses are allowed to be present at executions in addi-
tion to the twelve reputable citizens required to be present by law.98 In
light of these statutory provisions, these cases may actually support
granting members of the broadcast media in California a right of access
to executions, because in California the public already has access to the
chamber in a representative capacity. Far from denying access, these
two cases affirm the broadcast media's rights, because the media's rights
must be commensurate with the rights of the public.
Similarly, in Houchins v. KQED the issue was "whether the news
media have a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and
above that of other persons, to interview inmates and make sound re-
cordings, films, and photographs for publication and broadcasting by
newspapers, radio, and television." 99 In voting to uphold a jail regula-
tion denying such access, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Under our hold-
ings in Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. . . . the media
have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different from
or greater than that accorded to the public generally." 1°° However, as
noted above, in California the public has access to executions in a repre-
sentative capacity; thus, while the media's right of access cannot exceed
that of the public, surely it must be equal to it. Hence, Houchins also
supports the electronic media's right of access to the execution chamber.
In California, media representatives are invited to attend executions,
but their cameras must be left behind. 10 1 This does not comport with
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Houchins. 102 Since Justice Stew-
art's opinion is the "least common denominator" of the Court's decision,
it must govern; "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the hold-
ing of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' "103 Three
Justices voted to reverse a preliminary injunction that allowed KQED
access to the jail, and three Justices voted to affirm. Justice Stewart's
opinion argued that although the press may not have greater rights of
access than the public, "the First and Fourteenth Amendments required
98. See supra notes 52-53, 57-58 and accompanying text.
99. 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
100. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
101. See Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at 16.
102. See 438 U.S. at 16-19 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
103. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.)); see also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1529-30 & n.32 (2d ed. 1988) (so treating Justice
Powell's separate opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978)).
that the Sheriff give members of the press effective access to the same
areas."'1 4  Stewart stated that the
terms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of
the public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient jus-
tification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to
convey to the general public what the visitors see. 105
If the state deprives members of the electronic media of the use of their
equipment, in doing so it is depriving them of their First Amendment
right of access.
In addition, Houchins preceded the Quartet cases and Chandler, and
the Court's opinion today might more closely resemble Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion. In any event, the analysis is markedly different in
the Quartet cases. For example, in Richmond Newspapers Justice Stevens
observed in his concurring opinion, "This is a watershed case.... Today
• . . for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridgement of
the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First
Amendment." 0 6
Finally, opponents of television access might rely on Garrett v. Es-
telle, which denied camera access to the execution chamber.' 0 7 The Fifth
Circuit faced the issue of "whether a news cameraman can require the
[state] to permit him to film executions in state prison for showing on
television."'10 8 The court held that "the protection which the first
amendment provides to the news gathering process does not extend to
matters not accessible to the public generally, such as filming of execu-
tions in Texas state prison, and therefore [the cameraman] has no such
right."'1 9 Several flaws in this opinion render it logically unsound. Fur-
thermore, it is inapplicable to executions as they are carried out in
California.
First, the Garrett court held that
the press has no greater right of access.., than does the public at large
.... This principle marks a limit to the first amendment protection of
the press' right to gather news. Applying this principle to the present
case, we hold that the first amendment does not invalidate nondiscrimi-
natory prison access regulations. 010
Such reasoning is logically unsound because it applies too broadly: the
government might take any action beyond the reach of public scrutiny
104. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
106. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582-83 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
107. 556 F.2d 1274, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
108. Id. at 1275.
109. Id. at 1276.
110. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
August 1992] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BROADCAST EXECUTIONS 1505
and justify it merely by enacting a "nondiscriminatory" access regula-
tion. It makes no sense to deny the press the freedom to gather and
disseminate information on the grounds that this freedom is also denied
to the public. If it is constitutionally questionable to deny this freedom
to the press, it should be no more constitutional to deny it to both the
public and the press. The Garrett opinion suggests that an otherwise
questionable practice of denying press access to information is made le-
gitimate by denying access to everyone equally. 11 This ruling sets a dan-
gerous precedent: it is both contrary to the principles of a republican
form of government and logically unsound.
Second, the Garrett precedent is inapplicable to executions in Cali-
fornia. The Garrett court relied heavily on Pell and Saxbe in holding
that "the press has no greater right of access ... than does the public at
large." 112 Since Texas allowed pool reporters to witness executions but
denied such access to witnesses from the general public, press access was
already "well beyond that afforded the public generally. 11 3 The Garrett
court concluded that the "first amendment does not accompany the press
where the public may not go."' 114 However, in California, twelve mem-
bers of the general public and fourteen members of the press are present
by law. 115 Thus, according to Houchins the First Amendment should be
interpreted to permit the press to enter the execution chamber on an
equal basis with the public.' 16 Since the public has access to the execu-
tion chamber by virtue of the required presence of reputable witnesses,
Houchins suggests that the electronic media should also have access to
the execution chamber.
Third, Garrett preceded both the Quartet cases"1 7 and Chandler v.
Florida.1 " In light of these five cases, Garrett would have a different
outcome if it came before the Court today.
Finally, the Supreme Court merely denied certiorari in the Garrett
case.'1 9 A denial of certiorari may not be cited in support of any proposi-
tion of law, and merely indicates that "less than four members of the
Court believed that the petition should be granted." 120 Although no
111. Id.
112. 556 F.2d at 1278 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974), and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)).
113. Id. at 1279.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
116. See KQED v. Houchins, 438 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment).
117. The Quartet cases were decided between 1980 and 1986.
118. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
119. See 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
120. ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 353-54 (5th
ed. 1978) ("The Court has frequently reiterated that 'the denial of a writ of certiorari imports
no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times.' ")
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Supreme Court decision has acknowledged a First Amendment right of
the electronic media to gain access to the execution chamber, Garrett
does not support the proposition that the Court has rejected such a right.
(2) Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The opponents of televised executions might characterize the ban on
cameras in the courtroom as a time, place, or manner restriction. How-
ever, this attempt to exclude cameras from the courtroom must fail be-
cause the Supreme Court has ruled that time, place, or manner
restrictions may not be based on the content or subject matter of the
restricted communication.121 A ban on cameras in the execution cham-
ber is inherently based on the content and subject matter of the visual
presentation, and is therefore unconstitutional.
In Regan v. Time, Inc., the Court ruled that in order to be constitu-
tional, a time, place, or manner regulation must meet three requirements:
"First, it 'may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of
speech' 1-;122 second, "it must 'serve a significant governmental inter-
est' -1;123 and "third, it must 'leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.' "124 The Court held that
"[r]egulations which permit the government to discriminate on the basis
of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment." 125
The same analysis may be applied to the restriction on cameras in
the execution chamber. Since cameras are allowed into prisons to tele-
vise other events, 126 only the content of televised broadcasts of executions
differentiates regulations concerning this particular use of the camera.
Hence, the absolute ban on cameras violates the Court's prohibition
against content-based regulations, rendering such a ban unconstitutional
as a time, place, or manner restriction.1 27
(quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)); see also Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.) (denial of certiorari carries no
implication regarding the merits).
121. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
122. Id. at 648 (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 536 (1980))).
123. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536, and Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976))).
124. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536, and Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771))).
125. Id. at 648-49 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980), and Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
126. See infra text accompanying note 169.
127. See Regan, 468 U.S. at 648.
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This complete ban also fails with respect to the third criterion estab-
lished by the Court; it fails to "leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." 128 As noted below, more narrowly
tailored alternatives exist that would qualify as valid time, place, or man-
ner restrictions which are not based on the content of the speech. 129
Such restrictions would "not prevent [the media] from expressing any
view on any subject .... More importantly, the Government does not
need to evaluate the nature of the message being imparted in order to
enforce the [restrictions]." 130 Such restrictions would also serve the
state's interest in protecting the identity of guards and witnesses. In sum,
even if one concedes that the regulation comports with the Court's sec-
ond criterion, a compelling governmental interest, the regulation would
still fail to comply with the first and third criteria.
The warden's complete ban cannot pass constitutional muster as a
time, place, or manner restriction under the Regan test. Moreover, the
state cannot argue that the same message could be expressed through the
print media because "a statute that substantially abridges a uniquely val-
uable form of expression ... cannot be defended on [this ground]." ' 131
(3) The Condemned's Right to Privacy
Finally, the condemned herself may assert a right to privacy in op-
position to the media's right to televise her execution. Although her pri-
vacy claim is based on both case law132 and the California
Constitution,1 33 it may not be sufficient to overcome the media's First
Amendment right to broadcast her execution. The California Constitu-
tion provides: "All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are ... privacy."' 34 Furthermore, the
Court remarked in Pell v. Procunier that the prisoner "retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with [his] status as a pris-
oner."135 Although Pell concerned the First Amendment rights of pris-
oners and the press, an opponent of televised executions might argue that
a prisoner's retained rights include the right to privacy; such a claim
would be markedly enhanced by the California Constitution's explicit
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 166-170.
130. Regan, 468 U.S. at 656.
131. Id. at 678 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also supra text
accompanying notes 79-86.
132. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
133. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. This Note presumes that the condemned will not waive her
right to privacy, because such a waiver would arguably eliminate her right as a barrier to
televising the execution.
134. Id.
135. 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
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guarantee of this right. However, the media is not defenseless against
this claim.
First, David Kuriyama has addressed this issue in the context of
televised trials, 136 noting that the "constitutional right of privacy [in-
cludes] 'freedom from public disclosure of private information,' "137 and
that the right "comes into conflict with the first amendment's free press
guarantee."' 138 Kuriyama suggests that a criminal defendant may have a
relatively weaker privacy interest because the criminal has been arrested,
indicted, and tried, during which time "much of a defendant's private life
[is] publicly exposed and dissected."' 3 9 Kuriyama then makes an argu-
ment that is readily applicable to the execution context, given the poten-
tial increase in the frequency and public scrutiny of executions: "It could
be argued, then, that criminal defendants are 'public figures' with respect
to their particular charged crime, even though they do not voluntarily
seek the public spotlight. And it is well-established law that the privacy
right of public figures is considerably weaker than that of 'private' indi-
viduals." ° Thus, one may view a condemned inmate as a public figure
with a diminished expectation of privacy-an expectation over which the
First Amendment should prevail.
Furthermore, current prison regulations strip the condemned of her
privacy rights and give the press's right of access de facto superiority
over her privacy interests.14' California law requires the presence of
twelve reputable witnesses, with no mention of the condemned's privacy
right.142 Warden Vasquez of San Quentin Prison put it bluntly when he
stated that the witnesses would attend the execution "regardless of what
the condemned man's wishes are"' 43 and that the "inmate doesn't have
any say so." 44 Although such a pronouncement does not carry the im-
primatur of the Supreme Court, at a minimum it demonstrates that the
privacy interests of the condemned are insufficient to prevent the pres-
ence of the witnesses.1
45
136. Kuriyama, supra note 84, at 116-30.
137. Id. at 119 (quoting Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 127-28.
140. Id. at 127 n.206 (citations omitted).
141. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (West Supp. 1992).
143. Vasquez Deposition at 57, KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19791 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1991).
144. Id.
145. KQED would not have televised the execution over the privacy objection of Robert
Alton Harris. Transcript of Proceedings, Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS). KQED assumed the
issue of whether privacy interests would prevail over the rights of the broadcast media would
require litigation, which KQED wished to avoid. Id.
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The press has yet another weapon in its arsenal against the con-
demned's privacy right. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 146 the Court
faced the issue of whether the press infringed a father's right of privacy
"by broadcasting to the world the fact that his daughter was a rape vic-
tim."1 47 Reasoning that the press functions as a surrogate for the pub-
lic,148 the Court held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
command nothing less than that the states may not impose sanctions on
the publication of truthful information contained in official court records
open to public inspection."1 49 The reasoning employed by the Cox Court
echoes much of the reasoning used in the Quartet cases:
Without the information provided by the press most of us... would be
unable to vote intelligently or to register [our] opinions on the adminis-
tration of government generally. With respect tojudicial proceedings in
particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of
trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon
the administration ofjustice.150
Two elements were critical to the Court's reasoning. First, "The com-
mission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings
arising from the prosecutions ... are without question events of legiti-
mate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility
of the press to report the operations of government." 15' 1 Second, "There
is no liability when the [press] merely gives further publicity to informa-
tion about the plaintiff which is already public."'
' 52
Though the facts of Cox are not on point, the Court's reasoning is
nonetheless applicable to the context of executions. First, the names of
all witnesses to an execution are reported in the public record, and there
can be no liability for the broadcasting of that which is in the public
record. 153 Second, the event of the execution itself is the ultimate act of
the state against the individual-one which many citizens believe is un-
constitutional. The public can best scrutinize the constitutionality of ex-
ecutions through the surrogacy of the press. 154 The Court in Cox stated
146. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
147. Id. at 492.
148. Id. at 491-92 (The individual "relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of [the operations of his government]. Great responsibility is accord-
ingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of govern-
ment, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental
operations.").
149. Id. at 495.
150. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 494 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977)); see
also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971); William
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
153. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 494.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86; infra Part III (cameras will help in deter-
mination of contemporary societal standard).
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that judicial proceedings are "without question events of legitimate con-
cern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the
press to report the operations of government." 155 An execution is the
final event in a series of judicial proceedings to which the television me-
dia should have access. In Cox, the First Amendment freedom of the
press prevailed over an individual's right of privacy. Similarly, the
broadcast media's First Amendment right of access should prevail over
the condemned's right of privacy.
F. The State Interest Must Be Compelling and Served by Narrowly
Tailored Means
Once the First Amendment is found to protect the electronic me-
dia's right of access to the execution chamber, this right can only be
overcome by a restriction that is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. 156 Because the state has intruded upon a fundamental in-
terest, the court must apply strict scrutiny:1 57 the state interest must be
compelling and the intrusion narrowly tailored to vindicate it in order to
overcome that fundamental interest.15 8 As will be shown, the state inter-
est is insufficiently compelling, and the means chosen to promote it-
total exclusion of cameras-are not sufficiently narrowly tailored.159
What interests did the state assert in KQED v. Vasquez?160 The goal
of promoting a fair trial is irrelevant at the execution stage. Moreover,
even the fair trial interest did not overcome the broadcast media's right
of access in the Quartet cases. So what reason did the state offer for
abridging the media's First Amendment interests? The primary reason
given by defendant Vasquez for denying reporters the use of their cam-
eras was the protection of the identity of the official witnesses and correc-
tional officers present at the execution.1 61 This interest is insufficiently
compelling because the identities of the witnesses are immediately dis-
155. 420 U.S. at 492.
156. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion of Burger, C.J.); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press I], 464 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984); Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court [Press I1], 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986).
157. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963) (holding that only a compelling interest may overcome a First Amendment
Freedom)); see also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (holding that a strict
scrutiny analysis was properly applied to an anti-picketing ordinance because it affected First
Amendment interests).
158. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (citing San
Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973)).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 162-169.
160. No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19791 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1991).
161. Vasquez Deposition at 7-12, 32, Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS); Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Memo.].
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closed and made a matter of public record upon the warden's return of
the death warrant. 162 Moreover, the officers on duty at the execution
cannot be required to attend; they must volunteer.
1 63
In Globe, the state's interest in protecting a minor victim of a sex
crime was insufficiently compelling to justify mandatory closure of the
trial, in part because the names of the minor victims were already in the
public record. 164 This suggests that the state's interest in protecting iden-
tities already in the public record is not compelling. Moreover, in Press
, while acknowledging that the fair trial and juror privacy interests may
be compelling, the Court held that "[a]bsent consideration of alternatives
to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir
dire."165 These cases demonstrate that the state's interest in protecting
identity is insufficiently compelling to overcome the media's First
Amendment right to televise executions, and that even if a compelling
state interest were found, a complete ban on cameras would be too broad,
because more narrowly tailored alternatives are available.
For example, the identity of guards and witnesses can be protected
by means of prescribed camera angles, screens that block them from
view, or electronic masking of faces and voices. These types of regula-
tions were implemented in Chandler 66 and would accommodate both
the need to protect witness and officer identity and the electronic media's
First Amendment right of access to the execution chamber.
Another interest asserted by the state in KQED v. Vasquez was the
prison's need for security.1 67 However, prison officials' current practice
of searching cameras 68 provides a more narrowly tailored alternative
that would accommodate both security and First Amendment interests.
Moreover, cameras are currently allowed into parole hearings, clemency
hearings, and news conferences with the condemned prior to execu-
tion. 169 Cameras may be brought to many events within the prison de-
spite potential security risks. In fact, on the order of United States
District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, a video camera recorded Robert Al-
ton Harris's last moments in San Quentin's gas chamber. 170 The pres-
162. CAL PENAL CODE § 3607 (West 1982); Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at 15;
Plaintiff's Memo., supra note 161, at 14.
163. Vasquez Deposition at 17, 32, Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS).
164. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 (1982).
165. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [Press 1], 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
166. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 566 (1981).
167. See Vasquez Deposition at 20, 32, Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS) (mentioning danger
of cameras breaking glass in execution chamber); id. at 55 (mentioning security risks in the
form of contraband being hidden inside cameras).
168. Id. at 32, 55.
169. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2032 (1992); Vasquez Deposition at 32, 38-39, 52-54,
Vasquez (No. C 90-1383 RHS); Plaintiff's Memo., supra note 161, at 15.
170. William Carlsen & Harriet Chiang, Harris Death Video Could be Made Public, S.F.
CHRON., April 23, 1992, at Al.
ence of a video camera at an execution appears by itself to prove that the
security risks posed by a video camera are minimal. Not only is it feasi-
ble for a camera to record an execution, but it has now been accom-
plished! In light of the camera's presence at these other events, including
Harris's execution, it is unlikely that the state could demonstrate security
risks that would warrant denying the broadcast media access to the exe-
cution chamber. Thus, the state interest is not sufficiently compelling,
and the policy of total exclusion is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
justify abridging the electronic media's First Amendment right of access
to the execution chamber.
II. Equal Protection Support for the Right of Access
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state may not treat similarly situated individuals differently. 171 By al-
lowing members of the print media to have access to the execution cham-
ber with the tools of their trade, but denying members of the electronic
media access to the execution chamber with the tools of their trade, the
state arguably violates the Equal Protection Clause.
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue, 172 Minnesota imposed a use tax on paper and ink products con-
sumed in the production of a publication.173 This special tax only bur-
dened a few major newspapers. 174 In holding that the use tax violated
the First Amendment, the Court reasoned that "[a] tax that singles out
the press, or that targets individual publications within the press, places a
heavy burden on the State to justify its action."'175
Similarly, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 176 a West Virginia
statute made it "a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written
approval of the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juve-
nile offender."' 177 The statute did not restrict the electronic media or any
form of publication except newspapers. 78 "In this very case, three radio
stations announced the alleged assailant's name before the Daily Mail
decided to publish it.' 179 The Court held that the magnitude of the
state's interest in protecting juveniles was insufficient to justify applica-
tion of a criminal penalty to newspapers alone.180
171. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 248 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
172. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
173. Id. at 577-78 (citing Act of Oct. 31, 1971, ch. 31, art. I, § 5, 1971 Minn. Laws 2561,
2565 (codified with modifications at MINN. STAT. §§ 297A.14, 297A.25(1)(i) (1982))).
174. Id. at 576.
175. Id. at 592-93.
176. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
177. Id. at 98 (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 49-7-3, 49-7-20 (1976)).
178. Id. at 104-05.
179. Id. at 105.
180. Id. at 106; see also id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that
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Finally, in Florida Star v. B.JF., 181 a Florida statute had made it
unlawful to publish the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instru-
ment of mass communication.1 82 The Court noted that the statute
does not prohibit the spread by other means of the identities of victims
of sexual offenses. An individual who maliciously spreads word of the
identity of a rape victim is thus not covered, despite the fact that the
communication of such information to persons who live near, or work
with, the victim may have consequences as devastating as the exposure
of her name to large numbers of strangers.
183
The Court expressly limited its holding: "[W]here a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may
lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state in-
terest of the highest order."184 The Court's reasoning is instructive:
"When a state attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful
publication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment
to advancing this interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the
smalltime disseminator as well as the media giant."
1 85
According to these cases, the electronic media may assert that the
state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it allows the print media the use of the tools of its trade in the
execution chamber but denies the broadcast media access on similar
terms.' 86 Such a regulation bans the electronic instruments but not print
instruments. Such a regulation is not an even-handed prohibition.'
87
Although Garrett v. Estelle rejected a similar equal protection claim
by the television media, the Garrett court did not engage in a proper
equal protection analysis. The court merely reasoned:
The Texas media regulation denies Garrett the use of his [video] cam-
era, and it also denies the print reporter the use of his [still] camera,
and the radio reporter the use of his tape recorder. Garrett is free to
make his report by means of anchor desk or stand-up delivery on the
TV screen, or even by simulation. There is no denial of equal
protection.188
The court not only failed to apply the minimal "rational basis" test, but
it also failed even to acknowledge the First Amendment freedom of the
press upon which the Texas regulation infringed. It is fallacious to hold
"a generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of communication, electronic
and print media alike, would be constitutional.").
181. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
182. Id. at 526 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (Vest 1987)).
183. Id. at 540.
184. Id. at 541.
185. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
186. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 248 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
187. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540; see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97, 110 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
188. 556 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
that to deny all media the use of the electronic tools peculiar to the televi-
sion media is equal protection. In order to be "equal," a regulation that
bans the use of the camera by the television media should then ban the
use of pencils and note pads by the print media. A ban that prevents the
print media from using electronic audio-visual equipment is no ban at all.
San Quentin's execution procedures actually deny all reporters the
use of the tools of their trades, 189 and therefore do not violate the Equal
protection Clause on their face. However, the court in KQED v. Vasquez
held that the warden could not prohibit the tools of the print media. 190
By denying similar access to the electronic media, San Quentin's practice
would deny equal protection. 91
III. The Right of Access and the Meaning of the Eighth
Amendment
In addition to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the television media's right of access to the execution chamber
derives additional support from a nexus with the Eighth Amendment.
This Part assumes that death as a punishment for certain crimes com-
ports with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment,1 92 and focuses instead on the constitutionality of the mode
of execution. 193 The Court has ruled that the meaning of cruel and unu-
sual punishment must be determined by reference to contemporary com-
munity standards. 194 An examination of the multitude of factors that
enter into a societal determination of the criteria for cruel and unusual
punishment is beyond the scope of this Note. But regardless of the sub-
stance of the debate, it is clear that without complete and accurate infor-
mation informing the discussion, a contemporary societal standard of
cruel and unusual punishment with regard to the mode of execution will
neither fully evolve nor accurately reflect the judgment society might
189. See Execution Procedures, supra note 3, at 16 (banning electronic equipment, still
cameras, and even writing implements and paper from the execution chamber).
190. KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19791, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 13, 1991) (oral opinion).
191. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 110 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in judgment).
192. The Supreme Court so held in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
193. For example, one may support or oppose using animals for scientific and medical
research for a multitude of valid reasons. Within that plethora of factors, the manner in which
the animals are treated would certainly have some influence upon one's opinion. The most
ardent supporter of such research might hesitate if she knew the animals suffered tremendously
and unnecessarily. Similarly, one may generally support or oppose the death penalty for a host
of valid reasons, but perhaps fewer would support unnecessarily cruel means, such as the rack
and screw. Cf Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947) (repeated
electrocution not unconstitutional).
194. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); id. at 227 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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render if it were allowed to witness live executions through the medium
of television. Complete and accurate information facilitates the evolution
and formation of any consensus. Televised executions would provide
complete and accurate information in a medium superior to any other in
terms of its ability to convey an image of the execution to the public.195
Thus, the availability of the most complete and accurate information
through televised broadcasts of executions would promote the develop-
ment of a contemporary community standard of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment against which particular modes of execution might be judged.
This nexus between the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the
press and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment validates the structural role of the press in the execution pro-
cess196 and bolsters the constitutional protection of the broadcast media's
right of access to the execution chamber.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment has not been regarded as a static concept...
"[the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Thus, an
assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of a chal-
lenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment.197
Moreover, both the majority and the dissenting Justices agreed that con-
temporary societal standards of decency must be the standards by which
punishments are judged. 198 Justice Brennan, in dissent, agreed that
"[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause 'must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.' "199 Justice Marshall not only agreed with this thesis, but
also addressed the lack of information surrounding the death penalty and
concluded that if Americans were fully informed they would consider the
death penalty to be a cruel and unusual punishment:
[I]f the constitutionality of the death penalty turns ... on the opinion
of an informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new death stat-
utes cannot be viewed as conclusive .... A recent study, conducted
after the enactment of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that
the American people know little about the death penalty, and that the
opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of
195. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
197. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.L)) (alteration by
court).
198. See id. at 173 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.)).
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a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death
penalty.2
°°
The best decision is an informed decision. Through television, the
electronic media can provide the most accurate information to the Amer-
ican citizenry, save for those few citizens who witness the execution in
person.20 1 As a result, televised access to the execution chamber would
both allow the public to arrive at an informed determination of the social
acceptability of the death penalty, and facilitate the evolution of a fully
informed contemporary societal standard of decency with regard to the
mode of execution.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the television media may assert a First Amendment
right of access to the execution chamber based on the historical and
structural criteria established in Richmond Newspapers and reaffirmed in
the other Quartet cases. This right of access is further supported by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the televi-
sion media may invoke additional protection by positing a nexus between
its First Amendment freedoms and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment. The inescapable conclusion is that
KQED v. Vasquez was wrongly decided; the media should have a Consti-
tutional right to televise executions.
200. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
201. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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